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Abstract
Given a firm’s investment policy, its dividend policy is irrelevant
(Miller and Modigliani (1961)). REITs, by law, pay at least 90 % of
their corporate income as dividends, so that their dividend policy is
given. This is a reversal of the dividend irrelevance theorem through
regulatory means. Such a high dividend payment also means lower re-
tained earnings, leaving firms with little free cash flow. Jensen (1986)
argues that lower free cash flow results in mitigated agency problems.
In this paper, I ask two questions. First, how does an average REIT,
given its dividend policy restricted through regulation, respond to its
investment opportunities? Second, does an average REIT, with mit-
igated agency problems, face less severe financing constraints? In re-
sponse to the first question, I find that an average REIT’s investment
responsiveness (as measured by Tobin’s q) is higher than that of firms
in other industries. In response to the second question, I find that,
despite mitigated agency costs, an average REIT faces, in fact, more
severe financing constraints (as measured by sensitivity to cashflow)
than other firms. Finally, using the natural experiment provided by
the 2001 REIT Modernization Act (RMA) that allowed REITs to own
taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS) and reduce their dividend distribu-
tion from 95% to 90%, I show that, for a given increase in internal
funds, the negative impact arising from increased agency problems
dominates the positive impact of the wealth effect, resulting in a lower
overall responsiveness of REITs to their investment opportunities.
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1 Introduction
In 1960, Congress created Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in the US.
Coincidentally, a year later, Miller and Modigliani (1961) rigorously proves
dividend irrelevance theorem which says given a firm’s investment policy,
its dividend policy is irrelevant. REITs are stipulated by law to remit at
least 90 percent of their corporate income into dividends so their dividend
policy is given. This flips the dividend irrelevance theorem. The first ques-
tion, I ask how an average REIT, given its dividend policy, responds to its
investment opportunities. Such a high dividend payment also means lower
retained earnings so little free cash flow. Jensen (1986) argues lower free cash
flow mitigates agency problems. My second question is if an average REIT
(with mitigated agency problems) faces lower financing constraints. For the
first question, I find that, for manufacturing firms, on average, one standard
deviation increase in q results in 0.13 standard deviation increase in invest-
ment responsiveness whereas for REITs one standard deviation increase in
q results in 0.17 standard deviation increase in investment responsiveness.
For the second question, I find that an average REIT faces, in fact, higher
financing constraints than other firms. For manufacturing firms, on aver-
age, one standard deviation increase in cashflow results in 0.04 standard
deviation investment - cashflow sensitivity whereas for REITs one standard
deviation increase in cashflow results in 0.06 standard deviation investment
- cashflow sensitivity. Therefore, despite having lower free cash flow agency
issues, REITs face more severe financing constraints compared to manu-
facturing firms. These statistically significant differences are economically
meaningful.
Effective from 2001, REIT Modernization Act (RMA) allowed REITs to
own taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS) and reduce the dividend distribution
requirement from 95% to 90%. In other words, RMA allowed REITs, first, to
add and diversify their product mix widening their investment opportunity
set and, second, to retain more earnings for investment purposes. Given
this policy change which I exploit as a natural experiment in our study for
exogenous variation (in dividends payout and q), I find that higher free cash
flow lowers the investment responsiveness by escalating financing constraints
despite a simultaneous increase in internal funds and q.
A REIT is a firm that owns, and in most cases, operates income-producing
real estate. In 1960, Congress created REITs in the U.S. as a means to
facilitate an easy access for small investors to invest in large-scale, income-
producing real estate. Prior to REITs, access to the investment returns of
commercial real estate equity as a core asset was more or less confined only
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to institutions and wealthy individuals. In order for a firm to qualify as
a REIT in the US, it must comply with certain ground rules specified in
the Internal Revenue Code including an investment of at least 75% of total
assets in real estate, deriving at least 75% of gross income as rents from real
property or interest from mortgages on real property and distributing annu-
ally at least 90% of taxable income to shareholders in the form of dividends.
A firm that qualifies as a REIT is permitted to deduct dividends paid to its
shareholders from its corporate taxable income.
Higher dividend payouts can make it much harder for management to
squander the funds on wasteful projects. Jensen (1986) argues the optimal
mechanism to achieve the goal is to increase the leverage since it is more
difficult for management to renege on a debt than on dividends. However,
for REITs, at least 90 percent of the corporate income has to be paid in
dividends to retain the status so a renege on dividends payment is out of
question. Free cash flow is also viewed as a channel where wealth is trans-
ferred to debtholders from shareholders. Just as shareholders want to in-
crease dividends to the maximum extent to discipline managers, debtholders
may want to limit dividends to avoid the problems of debt overhang (Myers
(1977)) and risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Since for REITs
dividend policy is already put in place before any debt is issued, debthold-
ers, aware of the fact that the most of the earnings would be transferred to
shareholders, can design the terms of contract optimally (Myers (1977)).
It is an important policy question how government can influence invest-
ment in an industry by altering its dividend policy. If one of the objectives
back in 1960 when the US Congress enacted REITs law was to increase in-
vestment in real estate, it seems it has served some of its purpose over time.
According to NAREIT, listed U.S. REITs in 2010, constitute a more than
$300 billion equity market with an average daily trading volume of about
$4 billion. Unlisted REITs in the U.S. now manage assets of more than $70
billion and are adding another $7 billion annually.
2 Literature Review
There are mainly two lines of thoughts serving as foundational grounds for
majority of studies in dividend literature - Lintner (1956) and Miller and
Modigliani (1961). On the basis of results from a survey with corporate pro-
fessionals Lintner (1956) documents that managers decide dividends policy
first and other policies are adjusted taking dividend policy as given. Al-
most after 50 years since Lintner (1956) study, Brav, Graham, Harvey and
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Michaely (2004) documents that firms still determine their dividend and in-
vestment policy together. On the other hand, Miller and Modigliani (1961)
rigorously shows that, given a firm’s investment policy in a perfect and
complete capital markets, dividends have no relevance on its value.
Unarguably, Miller and Modigliani (1961) is based on very simplistic
assumptions, a number of studies followed afterwards with interesting im-
plications by relaxing those assumptions. Most notably of them are signaling
or asymmetric information based studies such as Bhattacharya (1979), John
and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985). In our setting, signaling
explanations have only limited relevance because of two reasons. First, div-
idend policy is already regulated so dividends cease to be a discretionary
variable in the hands of management. Second, there is no taxation on divi-
dends for REITs and tax is the cost of signal (for it to be credible) in most
studies.
Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) proposes an explanation
that develops the relation between dividend changes and risk changes also
known as ”maturity hypothesis”. It says a firm pays dividends when it
becomes mature in its life cycle resulting in one with a shrunk investment
opportunity and a concomitant decline in risk. For REITs, this explana-
tion may not hold since they are required to pay a high rate of dividends
right from their inception. Another study by Baker and Wurgler (2004) or
catering theory of dividends is based on argument that managers pay div-
idends to satisfy investors’ changing preferences for dividends. For REITs,
dividends have to be paid each period regardless of investors’ preferences so
this study has limited explanation for the present context.
Explaining dividends as a means to restrict agency problems comes long
way. Easterbrook (1984) notes three sources of agency concerns. One source
of agency concern is between management and shareholders as advocated by
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) where managers maximize
their gains at firm’s cost. Second source of agency costs originates between
debtholders and the management acting in interests of shareholders. While
Myers (1977) shows how debt overhang may preclude management to take
positive NPV projects, Jensen and Meckling (1976) documents how risk
shifting behavior may induce managers to undertake riskier projects at the
cost of debtholders. The third source of agency costs is risk aversion on
the part of managers as documented by Marcus (1982). The intuition is
that managers have substantial part of their personal wealth tied to their
firms. If firms perform poorly or go bankrupt, managers will lose their jobs
and, even worse, it may be harder for them to find similar opportunities
somewhere else. Thus, managers’ personal risk aversion can make them
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choose projects that are safer than necessary. Agency based explanations
for dividend payouts are more suitable to our context even though dividend
payment for REITs is a regulatory restriction.
Literature on financing constraints widely known as investment cash flow
sensitivity is enormous. Hubbard (1998) and Schiantarelli (1996) document
excellent reviews. The equation estimating financing constraints used by
several studies including Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, 2000, here-
after FHP) is following:
Investmentit = αi + αt + βqi,t−1 + γCashflowit + uit (1)
The interpretation for this equation is that in a frictionless world, with a
measure of marginal q, investment’s response to its opportunities should be
one to one. Therefore, the coefficient on q should be unity and coefficient on
cash flow (which is used as a measure of firm’s net worth) should be zero.
However, in the presence of frictions and with a less than perfect estimate
of average q, the coefficient on q could be less than unity and the coefficient
on cash flow is positive. FHP establishes, in nutshell, higher the magnitude
of the coefficient on cash flow, the higher the degree of financing constraints
a firm faces.
q is essentially a marginal concept in the sense that it establishes the
connection between investment and increase in firm value via incremental
capital stock but marginal q remains unobserved. Hayashi (1982) lays out
the conditions for equality of marginal and average q. It says that for a
price taker firm (in a perfectly competitive output market) if both of its
production function and cost of adjustment function are linearly homoge-
nous of same degree, average and marginal q are equal. If these conditions
are not met, average q turns out to be a potentially poor proxy for marginal
q. Other potentially serious issues with the usage of average q include en-
dogeniety (Poterba (1988)) and measurement error (Erickson and Whited
(2000)).
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) raise skepticism on the validity of cash
flow sensitivity to investment. One of the potential issues is the usage of
an a priori variable to classify firms with varying degree of financial con-
straints. They argue that the choice of an a priori variable is endogenous
and also choice of such variable could be correlated with investment cash
flow sensitivity. So, it might serve a poor or sensitive proxy. As a result,
the cross sectional analysis may become sensitive to the choice of such a
priori variable. Moreover, single variable might not reveal any non linearity
of sensitivity of investment cash flow sensitivity if it exists among different
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firms. In this study, I do not employ any a priori variable to classify firms
on the scale of financial constraints. Second potential concern they raise is
on the validity of assumption of monotonicity of financial constraints with
respect to cash flow. This issue is still largely unresolved in the literature.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) were able to exploit qualitative information of
the firms in their sample due to its small size to create an index which is
later termed as KZ index by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001). Using
a larger sample and broader time horizon, Whited and Wu (2006) construct
Whited Wu (WWu) index to measure the degree of financial constraints a
firm may face. As Whited and Wu (2006) point out the usage of such indices
is subject to temporal and cross sectional variation.
Studies such as Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) and Hovakimian (2009) at-
tempt to circumvent the issue of a priori classification adopting alterna-
tive approaches. Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) adopts an endogenous regime
switching regression model to classify firms into different states but the prob-
lem is only partly resolved with this technique since the number of regimes
may be limited. Hovakimian (2009) uses the error term from the estimation
of above equation to classify firms into different investment cash flow sensi-
tivity groups. The idea is the average of the error term should not be very
significantly different between high and low cash flow states for an uncon-
strained firm. The potential limitation with this approach is that it rules
out the possibility for a firm to have both unconstrained and constrained
periods of financing constraints.
Lamont (1997) and Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) an-
alyze the sensitivity of investment to cash flow shock for smaller and focused
samples. Lamont (1997) analyzes the role of internal capital markets for a
small sample of firms in oil industry with non-oil subsidiaries. He docu-
ments how a shock in cash flow for oil business in those companies affects
the investment in non-oil business with no change in investment opportuni-
ties. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) asks how managers
disburse windfall funds with no change in investment opportunities. They
find that managers do not return the funds to the stakeholders of the firm.
Their results emphasize the role of agency issues.
This is not the only study that examines the financing constraints for
REITs. Gentry and Mayer (2005) has already examined the investment
responsiveness of REITs. The focus of this study differs from that study.
This study compares the investment responsiveness of REITs with that of
firms in other industries instead of examining firms within REITs industry.
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3 Hypotheses Development
The intuition can be imparted parsimoniously with figure 1. The capital
stock is on the horizontal axis whereas risk-adjusted cost of capital is on the
vertical axis. D is downward sloping curve for a firm’s demand for capital. In
a perfect world of Modigliani and Miller (1958) with no frictions, the supply
schedule is rr′. Internal funds and external funds are perfect substitutes for
each other. In figure 1, rc is the amount of internal funds and cr′ is the
amount of external funds. The equilibrium is achieved at point a with the
capital stock, F and risk adjusted cost, r.
However, the world is far from being so perfect and there do exist frictions
such as asymmetric information and agency problems. In the presence of
frictions, internal and external funds cease to be perfect substitutes for each
other. Therefore, the supply curve becomes rcS0. The slope of the curve,
cS0, is determined by the degree of frictions the firm faces. The segment, rc,
still represents firm’s internal funds at its disposal. The risk adjusted cost
of internal funds is r which is also the risk-adjusted firm’s cost of capital.
OW0 may be considered as firm’s net worth. For external funds, firm pays
a higher price than its shadow cost of internal funds, r. The premium is
due to frictions. The equilibrium is attained where demand schedule D and
supply curve, rcS0, intersect each other. Now, the equilibrium price is b
which is higher than the firm’s cost of capital, r and new quantity of capital
is K which is lower than that of the first best, F .
Let’s consider an impact of lower internal funds on the equilibrium hold-
ing else constant. At net worth, OW1, the internal funds are shrunk to
re from rc. Since it is assumed, nothing else changes so the demand curve
and the slope of eS1 portion of supply curve remains unchanged. With this
new supply curve, we have a new equilibrium. The price is d which is even
higher than b and new quantity is L which is even lower than K. With
lower internal funds, firm pays even higher price to get ab lower amount
of external funds in presence of frictions. Figure 1 is the same figure as
appeared in Hubbard (1998). It simply says that in presence of frictions,
external funds are costlier than internal funds. As FHP acknowledges it is
an asymmetric information setting. This result is in the spirit of Myers and
Majluf (1984) where in presence of asymmetric information between firm
and outside investors, internal funds are preferred.
The frictional premium could be due to asymmetric information quite
as much as due to agency problems. In Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (1994), agency effect of an increase in cash flow is nothing but the
effect of free cash flow for a given set of investment opportunities. However,
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the equation given in the previous section can not simply distinguish between
cash flow and free cash flow. Free cash flow hypothesis implies that firm with
a free cash flow spends it on wasteful projects. If so, outside investors will
add the layers of frictional premium in tandem with level of free cash flow a
firm has. Therefore, higher the free cash flow a firm has, larger the frictional
premium it pays.
Next we consider the impact of lower free cash flow in figure 2. Let us
assume that the firm has not only lower net worth, re, but also lower free
cash flow. Jensen (1986) argues that lower free cash flow lowers agency costs.
Consequently, the slope of the supply curve for external funds becomes less
steep and rotates downwards to reS2 from reS1. With this new supply
curve we have a new equilibrium at f where the firm now pays a lower price
f than d and gets even higher amount of capital, M than L. So with the
same amount of internal funds, a firm with a lower free cash flow is likely
to be less financing constrained than the similar firm with higher free cash
flow. In our context, REIT’s supply schedule should be reS2 resulting in
lower financing constraints. Based on the discussion, two hypotheses are
formed:
Hypothesis 1: Given its dividend policy, how does an average REIT
respond to its investment opportunities?
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, whether an average REIT with lower free
cash flow (implying mitigated agency costs) faces lower financing constraints
for its investment needs when it accesses capital markets to obtain external
funds.
To capture the cross sectional differences in cash flow (or net worth)
among firms, several studies have employed various a priori variables to
classify firms on varying degree of financing constraints. For instance, FHP
uses dividend payouts and Whited (1992) uses leverage ratios as a priori
variable to classify firms. Firms that make higher dividend payouts are
likely to be less financing constrained than firms that make lower payouts.
Similarly, firms with lower leverage are expected to be less financing con-
strained than firms with higher leverage. Interestingly, as we will see later,
for REITs both - dividend payouts and leverage ratios - are high. In this
paper, I do not use any a priori variable to classify firms.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
I obtain the data from COMPUSTAT for firm specific accounting informa-
tion, I/B/E/S for analysts’ coverage, and CRSP for firms’ beta from 1985
to 2010. The sample starts from 1985. Following literature, manufacturing
firms are taken as the control group. The identification strategy is as follows:
I classify firms with SIC code 6798 as REITs since this code is exclusively
allotted to only REITs. Firms with SIC code between 1999 and 4000 are
classified as manufacturing firms.
The variables are defined as follows. Firm investment is measured as
capital expenditures (item128) scaled by total assets (item6). Cashflow is
measured as the sum of the income before extraordinary items (item18) and
depreciation and amortization (item14) scaled by total assets (item6). To-
bin’s q (average) is calculated as market value of equity (item 24 multiplied
by item 25) plus book value of assets minus book value of equity minus
deferred taxes (item 6 - item 60 - item 74), scaled by total assets (item6).
Our proxy for free cash flow variable is the total cash dividends paid by a
firm in a year (item 19) scaled by total assets (item 6). The idea is higher
the dividend payout, lower the free cashflow a firm has. Due to high corre-
lation with cashflow, retained income which would have been an ideal free
cash flow variable is not employed in our analysis. Firm size is measured as
natural logarithm of total assets (item6). Leverage is measured as long-term
debt (item9) plus short-term debt (item34) divided by total assets (item6).
Cash is defined as cash holding (item1) scaled by total assets (item6). Net
Income is measured as net income (loss) (item 172) scaled by total assets
(item6). Analyst coverage is the headcount of analysts following a firm in a
given year. Firms’ betas are obtained from CRSP files. It is calculated on
annual-basis using daily returns from the market model.
Our final sample comprises 63693 firm-year observations for 6745 firms
and 26 years (1985-2010). Out of which, manufacturing firms account for
62149 firm-year observations for 6494 firms and REITs account for 1544
firm-year observations for 251 firms. (Due to non-availability of information
on cashflow, the sample size for REITs has greatly reduced from 4160 firm-
year observations for 425 firms to 1544 firm-year observations for 251 firms.)
Table 1 summarizes means, standard deviations and medians of the key
variables in our sample. The first 3 columns belong to REITs and the next
3 columns belong to manufacturing firms. The last column is the median
test for non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis statistic. Median cashflow for man-
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ufacturing firms is significantly higher at 0.07 than that of REITs at 0.03.
Median value of total assets for REITs at $487.41 millions is substantially
higher than that of manufacturing firms at $103.47 millions. A q greater than
unity calls for investment; it can be seen that the median Tobin’s average q
is the higher for manufacturing firm at 1.5 than REITs at 1.12. Following
the same pattern as that of q, mean investment for manufacturing firms is
substantially higher at 0.05 than that of REITs at 0.01. One observation
that stands out is the leverage ratio of REITs compared to manufacturing
firms. The median leverage ratio of REITs is 0.49 which is more than 2.5
times that of the manufacturing firms at 0.18. Jensen’s (1986) argument for
lower agency problems arising out of free cash flow was made for issuance
of debt. For REITs, we can see that they not only pay higher dividends but
have higher leverage also. This statistic fosters our intuition of REITs may
face lower agency issues from a lower free cash flow. As can be expected,
median cash or internal liquidity is lower for REITs at 0.02 than that of
manufacturing firms at 0.10. As expected, mean value of dividend to asset
ratio is higher for REITs at 0.06 than that for manufacturing firms at 0.01.
Median net income is similar for both groups at 0.03. All sample statistics
for the two groups are statistically different from each other as p values
from respective non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test statistics reject the null
of equality.
4.2 Main results
Investmentit = αi+αt+β1Cashflowit+β2qi,t−1+β3DivPayit+uit (2)
The variables investment, cashflow, and q are as defined as previously
for equation 1. The new variable in equation 2 is dividend payout (scaled
by assets) that is our proxy for potential free cash flow issues. Retained
earning would have been a better choice but due to multicollinearity, we
employ dividend payout. Our intuition is higher the dividend payout, lower
is the likelihood of a firm with high free cash flow. For firm and time effects,
we have firm and year dummies.
I estimate the equation 2 using firm fixed effects model. To overcome
potential outliers issue, I winsorize all the variables at 1 percent on both
tails. Recently, there has been a number of very insightful papers 1 enrich-
ing our understanding regarding the efficiency gains from alternative ways
1See Angrist and Pischke (2008), Petersen (2009), Stock and Watson (2008) and also
Thompson (2011).
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of clustering (one way or two way) of standard errors from panel data es-
timation. Thompson (2011) points the gains from two way clustering are
limited if there exists a fixed effect in the data and two way clustering may
do more harm than good if the panel is too unbalanced. Our panel is very
unbalanced and also there is a significant fixed effect present in every re-
gression. I, therefore, cluster the error in the model by firm in constructing
efficient standard errors.
Table 2 reports the estimation results of the above equation for REITs
and manufacturing firms with and without our free cash flow variable. First
3 columns report results for REITs and the following next 3 columns for
manufacturing firms. The results pertain to three different variants of the
above equation. The results of first variant which was employed by FHP
are reported in column 1 for REITs and column 4 for manufacturing firms.
Dependent variable is investment and explanatory variables are cashflow
and q along with year and firm dummies.
In FHP, higher the magnitude of coefficient on cashflow, greater a firm
is said to be dependent on its net worth or internal funds, hence more
likely to be financing constrained. In column 4, the coefficient on cashflow
is 0.012 and the coefficient on q is 0.004 for manufacturing firms. Both
coefficients are statistically significant at 99 % significance level. For REITs
(column 1), the coefficient on q is 0.006 which is statistically significant at
most conventional levels but the coefficient on cashflow is 0.01 which is not
statistically significant so cannot be distinguished from zero. It implies, in
the spirit of FHP analysis, that REITs do not face financing constraints.
In FHP, an a priori variable which is used to distinguish firms between
financing constrained and financing unconstrained is dividend payout. The
logic is dividend payout level is likely to be inversely related to the degree of
financing constraints a firm faces. If this is true, then REITs’ are less likely
to be financing constrained because of very high dividend payout. In this
paper, no a priori variable is used to classify firms on the scale of financing
constraints.
In column 3 and 6, the estimation results are reported including dividend
payout variable in our specification for REITs and manufacturing firms. For
REITs, the coefficient on cashflow, 0.018, has turned statistically significant,
coefficient on q has remained same at statistically significant 0.006 as before
and the coefficient on dividend payout, 0.318, is negative and statistically
significant. It seems it was causing some omitted variable bias. The nega-
tive coefficient implies that such a high dividend payout, in fact, depresses
investment for REITs. On the other hand, for manufacturing firms, we
find that the coefficient on cashflow has declined slightly than before at
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0.011, coefficient on q is still at .004 and the coefficient on dividend payout
is 0.167 implying that higher dividend payout helps investment. All coef-
ficients for manufacturing firms are statistically significant at conventional
levels. Different signs on dividend payout for the two groups seem to imply
that agency issues are relatively more important than asymmetric informa-
tion for manufacturing firms but for REITs, the order of importance seems
to be reversed. The adjusted R-squared is 0.47 and 0.68 for manufacturing
firms and REITs, respectively. The F-test statistic shows there is consider-
able fixed effect. To test the equality of coefficients from the two regressions,
I conduct an incremental F test with a p value of 0.001 suggesting that the
coefficients from the two samples are not equal. A pooled regression would
have been another alternative but the key assumption for pooled regression
is the variance in two groups be equal. I test the equality of variances (of
the residuals drawn from pooled regression) between the two groups and
found that null of equality of variances is rejected with p value even less
than 0.0001.
In summary, from the analysis above, two main results emerge. First, an
average REIT’s responsiveness to its investment opportunities is a bit higher
than that of an average manufacturing firms and second, an average REIT
faces greater financing constraints than an average manufacturing firm.
Over time, burgeoning literature on investment cash flow sensitivity has
established the variation of additional controls on investment. In this sec-
tion, I try to control for additional variables such as size, cash, leverage,
debt rating and analyst coverage. Our specification equation, is, now:
Investmentit = αi + αt + β1Cashflowit + β2qi,t−1 + β3DivPayit + γ1Sizeit
+γ2Cashit + γ3Leverageit + γ4AnalystCoverageit + uit
(3)
For equation 3, the variables – investment, cashflow, q and dividend pay-
out are as defined as before. We saw in the univariate statistics (table 1)
that a median REIT has a larger size than a median manufacturing firm.
Size may affect our results since firms with smaller size may be subject to
higher likelihood of adverse selection problems affecting their investment
given cash flow and investment opportunities. As documented by Huber-
man (1984), many investment opportunities are of ’now or never’ nature and
if not undertaken at the right time, they may vanish away. In such cases,
cash holding as precautionary motive serves as a vital source of liquidity
for funding. There are two additional benefits from holding cash. First,
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firms do not have to incur transaction costs to frequently raise funds. In a
structural approach, Gamba and Triantis (2008) documents the importance
of cash holding for financial flexibility by incorporating the costs of debt
issuance. Second, information asymmetry between managers and capital
market participants makes liquidity valuable as shown by Myers and Majluf
(1984). Cash could also serve a general purpose buffer against future cash
shortfalls. Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2009) terms cash as unconditional
liquidity, funds at firm’s disposal. Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2006)
develops a model which presents cash as a dynamic hedging tool. Debt is
issued to hoard cash so that a constrained firm can channel it across low cash
flow states. Another study by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) de-
velops a model that documents the cash flow sensitivity of cash which may
affect the investment. Due to all such reasons, cash holding is included as a
control variable in the equation. Table 1 reports that median REIT seems to
have a higher leverage than median manufacturing firm. A firm with higher
leverage may be facing a higher probability of debt overhang issues (Myers
(1977)). Alternatively, risk shifting argument, where firm’s management in
the interests of shareholders, takes up only risky projects at the expense of
debt holders is equally valid (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Clearly, both
issues affect investment. More analysts coverage for a firm implies more in-
formation production for that firm resulting in less information asymmetry.
This variable may be useful to assess the degree of asymmetric information
especially for those firms that do not have debt rating.
Table 3 reports the results from the above extended model. As ear-
lier, first three columns report results for REITs and the following three
columns report results for manufacturing firms. The cash flow sensitivity
of investment is much higher for REITs at 0.023 than that for manufac-
turing firms at 0.008. Similarly, the investment responsiveness of REITs is
also slightly higher for REITs at 0.006 compared to 0.005 for manufacturing
firms. While dividend payout affects positively the investment for manufac-
turing firms (0.152), it affects negatively the investment for REITs (-0.314).
All these coefficients are statistically significant. Other controls such as
cash and leverage are not significant for REITs but they have negative and
statistically significant impact on investment for manufacturing firms. The
coefficient on number of analysts is positive and statistically significant for
both groups but the magnitude is almost zero. Interestingly, size has a neg-
ative impact on REITs investment but the magnitude is a way too small to
imply any meaningful impact. The goodness of fit is tighter for REITs with
adjusted R-squared coefficient of 0.68 than that for manufacturing firms at
0.48. Apparently, there is still some heterogeneity that remains unexplained
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for manufacturing firms. The p value of the F test for equality of coeffi-
cients at 0.001 rejects the null of equality of coefficients. To summarize, an
average REIT’s responsiveness to its investment opportunities is higher and
faces severer financing constraints compared to an average manufacturing
firm.
Real estate is traditionally known to be a hedge against other financial
assets due to its low correlation with them. Several studies such as Geltner,
Miller, Clayton and Eichholtz, (2007) document that the risk characteris-
tics of real estate as an asset class falls between bonds and stocks. It is a
possibility that our current specification might not be capturing the risk-
related differences in the cost of funds for the different groups as pointed
by Hubbard (1998). Besides, given a high level of leverage for REITs (table
1), one may argue that debt overhang issue could prevent some REITs to
invest that may produce a downward bias. No investment, no financing con-
straints. Though the argument holds for new projects, high leverage itself
reflects the riskiness of a firm. As a next exercise, I control for risk related
differences between REITs and manufacturing firms by including beta into
the equation. Beta estimates are collected from CRSP files. CRSP estimates
betas using market model for daily returns on yearly basis. To capture the
inter-industry cross-sectional variation, I now pool the two groups together
to estimate the following equation.
Investmentit = αi + αt + δD + β1Cashflowit + β2qi,t−1 + β3DivPayit
+β4Sizeit + β5Cashit + β6Leverageit + ξ1D ∗ qit
+ξ1D ∗ Cashflowit + ξ3D ∗DivPayit + ξ4D ∗ Cashit
+ξ5D ∗ Sizeit + ξ6D ∗ Leverageit + γ1Betait
+γ2AnalystCoverageit + uit
(4)
In the above equation, a binary variable D is created such that it takes
value 1 for REITs and 0 otherwise. Other variables are as defined as before
for the equations 1 – 3. The results from the above equation 4 for pooled
regression for both groups are reported in table 5 to be discussed in details
in the next section.
The coefficients of prime interest are the ξ s in equation 4. These co-
efficients measure the differential sensitivities for REITs. For REITs, we
can note that the coefficients on interaction of REIT dummy, D with q,
ξ1, and the interaction with cashflow, ξ2, are both positive and statistically
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significant. Higher dividend payout negatively affects REITs’ investment.
A negative coefficient on leverage for manufacturing firms may suggest the
relevance of debt overhang issues but no such impact seems to affect REITs.
4.3 Natural Experiment
The Congress created REITs in 1960 to encourage small investors to invest
in real estate firms. Over time, the horizon of REITs has changed consider-
ably. Probably responding to the changed horizon, on December 17, 1999,
Congress and the President signed into law the REIT Modernization Act
(RMA) to go into effect from January 1, 2001. Two main features of RMA
are to allow REITs to own taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS) and reduce the
dividend distribution requirement from 95% to 90%. This legislation allows
REITs, first, to widen their investment opportunity set and, second, to re-
tain more earnings. While an increase in internal funds may facilitate more
and cheaper funds for investment, such an increase also raises the likelihood
of its abuse by managers by having now an access to a higher amount of free
cash flow.
To illustrate these dynamics intuitively and more lucidly, we refer to
figure 3. Let us consider, first, the impact of an increase in investment
opportunities. In figure 3, it shifts the demand schedule D rightwards to D′.
This shift results in more capital stock needed from M to P suggesting an
increase in investment, all else being equal. Next, let us consider the impact
of increase in internal funds. Increase in internal funds, ceteris paribus,
has two effects - wealth effect and agency effect. First, such an increment in
internal funds eases the financing constraints by having more funds available
at so it should lead to increase in investment. Second, such an increment
also increases the amount of free cashflow for a firm therefore raising the
possibility of its abuse leading to an increase in frictional premium demanded
by the market causing a downward impact on investment. Which of the two
effects dominates may differ across firms. In figure 3, this increases the level
of internal funds by ee′. However, this increment in internal funds may
also intensify the frictions faced by firms due to increases in free cash flow.
This development is depicted by a leftward rotation of the upward sloping
portion of the supply curve from eS2 to e′S2′. Now, the supply schedule,
re′S2′, is steeper than before. Finally, the new equilibrium is attained at the
intersection of the new demand schedule, D′, and supply schedule, re′S2′
with OQ units of capital at the cost c. In the figure, the new equilibrium
depicts an increase in capital for investment from OM to OQ but it is
certainly not a deterministic outome.
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This legislation (RMA) constitutes a natural experiment in our setting.
One popular way to evaluate the impact of RMA legislation in a panel
data setting is to estimate differences-in-differences estimator. Literature
on differences-in-differences (hereafter, DID) estimator is enormous 2. So
far, our analysis is based on the variation provided by cross sectional char-
acteristics of the explanatory variables in our specification. One of the po-
tential concerns is the validity of our analysis in the presence of endogeneity.
Poterba (1988) points out that it is hard to see what is driving what due to
endogeneity concerns. The natural experiment approach or policy change
provides a very useful source of identification strategy. By providing exoge-
nous variation, policy changes help us to get rid of endogeneity concerns.
The source of variation in investment for REITs, after RMA, is coming
through dividends and q as explained in figure 3. Table 4 reports summary
statistics of REITs and manufacturing firms before and after the change.
As expected, we can see for REITs in panel A that median q increased from
1.09 during pre RMA to 1.17 in post RMA period. Correspondingly, median
dividend payout decreased from 0.04 to 0.03 after RMA. Leverage and assets
size increased while net income fell after RMA. In panel B, for manufactur-
ing firms also, median q increased from 1.47 to 1.59 during the same period
but dividend payout remains more or less unchanged after 2000. In contrast
with REITs, leverage fell from 0.19 to 0.14 after 2000 for manufacturing
firms. The differences in statistics between the two periods for both groups
are statistically significant.
For DID estimation, we need two groups - one that is affected by the
policy change and the other not. We also need two time periods - one
accounting for pre-policy and the other accounting for post-policy change.
If we have such a setting, we can generate two binary variables - one for
treatment group and the other for treatment period and the interaction
of these two binary variables will capture the precise impact of the policy
change on the outcome of the affected group in post-policy change period.
The regression equation for measuring the impact after RMA is as follows:
2See Card(1990), Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), Card and Krueger(1994)
and also Meyer (1995).
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Investmentit = αi + αt + ζtrend+ φ(δ ∗D) + ρ1D + ρ2δ + η1(δ ∗D) ∗ q
+η2(δ ∗D) ∗ Cashflowit + η3(δ ∗D) ∗DivPay + β1qi,t−1
+β2Cashflowit + β3DivPayit + β4Sizeit + β5Cashit
+β6Leverageit + ξ1D ∗ Cashflowit + ξ2D ∗DivPayit
+ξ3D ∗ qit + ξ4D ∗ Cashit + ξ5D ∗ Sizeit + ξ6D ∗ Lvrgeit
+γ1Betait + γ2AnalystCoverageit + uit
(5)
In equation 5, we create two binary variables - one for REITs, D(as in
equation 4), and another for RMA, δ. The coefficient on the interaction of
these two binary variables, φ̂, is our DID estimator. In essence, the vari-
able that captures DID is nothing but a dummy variable that takes value
1 for REITs in post-RMA period. This dummy variable, however, captures
only the impact of policy change, RMA, on investment for REITs. It is an
important policy question but for our study the impact of financing con-
straints and investment responsiveness of REITs on investment after the
change are even more important. To capture the net change in the invest-
ment responsiveness and financing constraints for REITs after the policy
change, I simply interact the DID variable with cashflow and q to capture
net differences in sensitivities. I also interact DID variable with dividend
payout.
One may plausibly argue that manufacturing firms may not be an ap-
propriate control group for REITs for DID estimation. I argue this is not
so. Undeniably, there still may be some heterogeneity between REITs and
manufacturing firms which may remain unobserved in our specification but
the key identifying assumption of fixed effect estimation is that such unob-
served heterogeneity is captured by fixed effects. It is also true that fixed
effect captures only time invariant unobserved heterogeneity but in our spec-
ification we also have time dummies to capture any time variant effect. It
is fair to argue that year dummies are fixed in nature in the sense they do
not allow variation of any specific year effect over time so we include a trend
variable to capture time varying heterogeneity across the firms in these two
groups. The only assumption which allows us to run DID estimation is that
the investment in two groups would have remained similar if there had not
been a policy change. Other variables carry the same interpretation as for
equations 1 – 4. As previously, all variables are winsorized at both tails
by one percent. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and
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Rauh (2006), standard errors are clustered by industry to address the issues
of serial correlation since in our study the unit of policy change is industry.
Equation 5 fully nests equation 4 so I report results for only equation 5.
Estimation results from equation 5 are reported in table 5. The DID estima-
tor, φ, is 0.012 implying that the an average REIT’s investment increased
compared to that of a manufacturing firm’s due to RMA amendment. The
associated p value asserts its statistical significance. The coefficient on in-
teraction of DID and cashflow variable is positive, 0.008, and statistically
significant implying that the financing constraints for REITs increased after
RMA. Note that, in figure 3, we showed that increase in internal funds will
have both effects - wealth effect and agency effect, simultaneously. For a
given increase in internal funds, wealth effect would imply easing of the fi-
nancing constraints whereas an agency effect would imply intensification of
the financing constraints. The striking finding what this coefficient seems to
suggest is that the positive impact of increase in internal funds is completely
dominated by the negative impact of increase in free cash flow. The coeffi-
cient on interaction of DID and q is negative, -0.004, and also statistically
significant implying that the investment responsiveness of REITs after RMA
declined despite an increase in investment opportunity set (table 4). A lower
payout has a significant positive effect, 0.144, on the investment for REITs
after RMA. In nutshell, it may be concluded that while an increase in re-
tained income helps, higher agency issues associated with the higher level of
internal funds has exacerbated the financing constraints so much for REITs
that it results in lower responsiveness to their investment opportunities.
Coefficient on risk, beta, is marginal. Coefficient on trend, ζ, is negative
but too small to signify any presence of a time varying changes in time
effects. Coefficients on treatment dummy is negative, -0.007, implying that
the investment fell for both groups after 2000. So, given a positive, DID
estimator, φ̂ (0.012), it implies that investment for REITs after RMA inched
up only relatively to manufacturing firms.
5 Concluding remarks
An important question why some firms face more financing constraints than
others keeps haunting the finance literature on a regular basis. Most studies
compare varying degree of financing constraints for a set of firms within a
group of supposedly similar industries (manufacturing firms). This paper
evaluates the impact of a single friction on financing constraints in an inter-
industry comparison. The key result is that agency problems can substan-
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tially escalate the financing frictions resulting in higher financing constraints
even when there is a positive wealth effect.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics - 1985-2010 
This table reports the summary statistics of key variables for REITs and manufacturing firms. Investment is 
measured as capital expenditures (item128) scaled by total assets (item6). Cashflow is measured as the sum 
of the income before extraordinary items (item18) and depreciation and amortization (item14) scaled by 
total assets (item6). Tobin's q (average) is calculated as market value of equity (item 24 multiplied by item 
25) plus book value of assets minus book value of equity minus deferred taxes (item 6 - item 60 - item 74), 
scaled by total assets (item6). Dividends to assets are dividends paid scaled by total assets (item 6).Firm 
size are measured as natural logarithm of book assets (item6). Leverage is measured as long-term debt 
(item9) plus short-term debt (item34) divided by total assets (item6). Cash is defined as cash holding 
(item1) scaled by total assets (item6). Net Income is measured as net income/loss (item 172) scaled by total 
assets (item6). Statistical significances for the differences correspond to non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
rank-sum test for medians. 
 
Variables Mean  Std Er Median Mean  Std Er Median KW Test REITS Manufacturing Firms 
Cashflow 0.03 0.18 0.03 -0.05 0.58 0.07 0.0001 
Assets 1626.77 3617.65 487.41 2161.85 11982.89 103.47 0.0001 
q 1.18 0.57 1.12 2.34 1.02 1.50 0.0001 
Investment 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.0001 
Leverage 0.47 0.26 0.49 0.22 0.37 0.18 0.0001 
Cash 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.21 0.24 0.10 0.0001 
Div to Assets 0.06 0.28 0.04 0.01 0.05 0 0.0001 
Net Income 0.03 0.14 0.03 -0.10 0.62 0.03 0.0001 
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Table 2: Investment Cashflow Sensitivity 
This table presents the fixed effect investment – cashflow sensitivity results for REITs and manufacturing 
firms. The dependent variable is investment. And the explanatory variables are cashflow, Tobin’q and 
dividends including year dummies. The REITs sample has 1484 observations and the manufacturing 
sample has 60374 observations for 1985-2010. F test for fixed effects is a joint test for intercepts for the 
firms in fixed effect regression sample. F test for the equality of coefficients is test of equality of 
coefficients from the two samples. FHP refers to regression specification of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1986) or equation 1. All variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. The standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. The standard errors are estimated after clustering at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  REITs Manufacturing Firms 
  FHP Model 2  Model 3 FHP Model 2  Model 3 
Cashflow 0.010 
 
0.018** 0.012*** 
 
0.011*** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.006) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
Tobin's 'q' 0.006*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.18*** .004*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000227) (0.027) (0.0002) 
Div/Assets   
-
0.346*** 
-
0.318***   0.004*** 0.167*** 
 
  (0.087) (0.111)   (0.0002) (0.027) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.66 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Observations 1514 3891 1484 61027 60487 60374 
F Test (Fixed Effect)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F Test (Equality of 
coefficients)  0.000 
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Table 3: Investment Cashflow Sensitivity with additional controls 
This table presents the fixed effect investment – cashflow sensitivity results for REITs and manufacturing 
firms. The dependent variable is investment. And the explanatory variables are cashflow, Tobin’q and 
dividends including year dummies. Other controls are size, cash, leverage and number of analysts. The data 
and variables are described in the paper. The REITs sample has 1465 observations and the manufacturing 
sample has 60243 observations for 1985-2010. F test for fixed effects is a joint test for intercepts for the 
firms in fixed effect regression sample. F test for the equality of coefficients is test of equality of 
coefficients from the two samples. All variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. The standard errors are 
given in parenthesis. The standard errors are estimated after clustering at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  REITs Manufacturing Firms 
Cashflow 0.023** 0.008*** 
 
(0.01) (0.002) 
Tobin's 'q' 0.006** 0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.0001) 
Div/Assets -0.314*** 0.152*** 
 
(0.105) (0.026) 
Size -0.002* Positive 
 
(0.001) (Positive) 
Cash -0.003 -0.033 
 
(0.005) 
 Leverage 0.009 -0.015*** 
 
(0.006) (0.001) 
Number of Analysts Positive* Positive 
 
(0.00) 
 Constant 0.017 0.023*** 
 
(0.010) (0.002) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1465 60243 
Adj R-squared 0.68 0.48 
F Test (Fixed Effect) - p value 0.00 0.00 
F Test (Equality of coefficients) - p value 0.001 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics pre and post-RMA change 
This table reports the summary statistics of key variables pre and post-RMA for REITs (Panel A) and 
manufacturing firms (Panel B). Investment is measured as capital expenditures (item128) scaled by total 
assets (item6). Cashflow is measured as the sum of the income before extraordinary items (item18) and 
depreciation and amortization (item14) scaled by total assets (item6). Tobin's q (average) is calculated as 
market value of equity (item 24 multiplied by item 25) plus book value of assets minus book value of 
equity minus deferred taxes (item 6 - item 60 - item 74), scaled by total assets (item6). Dividends to assets 
are dividends paid scaled by total assets (item 6). Firm size are measured as natural logarithm of book 
assets (item6). Leverage is measured as long-term debt (item9) plus short-term debt (item34) divided by 
total assets (item6). Cash is defined as cash holding (item1) scaled by total assets (item6). Net Income is 
measured as net income/loss (item 172) scaled by total assets (item6). Statistical significances for the 
differences correspond to non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis rank-sum test for medians. 
 
Panel A: REITs 
Variables Mean  Std Er Median Mean  Std Er Median KW Test  1985 - 2000  2001 -2010 
Cashflow 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.00 
Assets 714.42 1439.60 233.56 3153.42 5273.14 1510.98 0.00 
Investment 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Net Income 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.00 
Leverage 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.56 0.23 0.56 0.00 
q 1.14 0.67 1.09 1.24 0.34 1.17 0.00 
Cash 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.04 
Div to Assets 0.07 0.34 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.00 
 
Panel B: Manufacturing Firms 
Variables Mean  Std Er Median Mean  Std Er Median KW Test  1985 - 2000 2001 -2010 
Cashflow -0.03 0.52 0.07 -0.09 0.68 0.06 0.00 
Assets 1406.76 7982.56 73.58 3777.63 17626.07 230.85 0.00 
Investment 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 
Net Income -0.08 0.55 0.03 -0.14 0.75 0.02 0.00 
Leverage 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.21 0.56 0.14 0.00 
q 2.35 4.34 1.47 2.32 3.20 1.59 0.00 
Cash 0.18 0.23 0.08 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.00 
Div to Assets 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5: Investment Cashflow Sensitivity – Pooled regression 
This table presents the fixed effect investment – cashflow sensitivity results for REITs and manufacturing 
firms. The dependent variable is investment. And the explanatory variables are cashflow, Tobin’q and 
dividends including year dummies. Other controls are size, cash, leverage, beta, trend and number of 
analysts. The data and variables are described in the paper. The sample has 59250 observations for 1985-
2010. D is dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is REIT otherwise 0. D*Cashflow is the interaction 
of cashflow and D. D*Tobin’s q is the interaction of Tobin’s q and D. D*Dividends is the interaction of 
Dividends and D. D*Size is the interaction of Size and D. D*Leverage is the interaction of Leverage and D. 
D*Cash is the interaction of Cash and D. Policydum is a dummy variable takes value 1 if post RMA period 
otherwise 0. Differences-in-differences (DiD) is the interaction of policydum and D. Cashflow*DD is the 
interaction of cashflow, policydum and D. Tobin’s q*DD is the interaction of Tobin’s q, policydum and D. 
Dividends*DD is the interaction of dividend, policydum and D. F test for fixed effects is a joint test for 
intercepts for the firms in fixed effect regression sample. F test for the equality of coefficients is test of 
equality of coefficients from the two samples. All variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. The 
standard errors are given in parenthesis. The standard errors are estimated after clustering at firm level. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t - value P>t 
D*Policydum 0.012*** 0.001 12.33 0.000 
DD*Cashflow 0.008*** 0.002 4.66 0.000 
DD*Tobin's q -0.004*** 0.000 -7.93 0.000 
DD*Dividends 0.144*** 0.005 27.18 0.000 
Cashflow 0.008*** 0.002 3.77 0.000 
Tobin' q 0.004*** 0.000 13.95 0.000 
Dividends 0.178*** 0.035 5.07 0.000 
Cash -0.032*** 0.002 -21.32 0.000 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.45 0.651 
Leverage -0.015*** 0.002 -6.6 0.000 
D*Cashflow 0.004* 0.002 1.73 0.085 
D*Tobin's q 0.002*** 0.000 5.43 0.000 
D*Dividends -0.509*** 0.036 -14.07 0.000 
D*Cash 0.030*** 0.002 19.9 0.000 
D*Size -0.002*** 0.000 -5.42 0.000 
D*Leverage 0.024*** 0.002 11.02 0.000 
Analyst Coverage Positive 0.000 3.97 0.000 
Beta 0.002*** 0.000 7.18 0.000 
Policydum -0.007*** 0.002 -4.16 0.000 
Trend -0.001*** 0.000 -15.74 0.000 
Constant 0.061*** 0.002 33.77 0.000 
Year Effects Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.50 
Number of obs 59250 
F(6525, 52682) - Fixed Effect 6.785 
p Value 0.000 
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